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NOTE

STRIPPED BARE: STUDENTS' FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, SCHOOL SEARCHES, AND THE
REASONABLENESS STANDARD
Erin P. Davenport
I.

Introduction

In Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District,' the
Sixth Circuit examined whether the law governing searches
of students, specifically strip searches, was clearly estab-2
lished and deprived school officials of qualified immunity.
The Sixth Circuit first evaluated the strip search's constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. 3 Then, the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether qualified immunity protected
school officials. 4 Beard demonstrates that students' Fourth
Amendment rights receive less protection than teachers'
liability and could result in students shedding "their constitutional rights at the school house gate." 5 With violence
and drug use on the rise in schools, courts consider students' constitutional rights less important than the school's
safety and security. 6 Beard held that the strip search's
scope was unconstitutional because the students' privacy
expectations, the search's intrusive nature, and "the severity of the school system's needs" favored the students-not
' 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005).
2

Id. at 601.

3

Id. at 603.

4 Id.at 606.
5 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)

(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
6 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)
(internal citations omitted); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339

(1985) (internal citations omitted).
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the school. 7 Nonetheless, the teachers received qualified
immunity because the law was not clearly established. 8
This synopsis will show how courts have approached the constitutional issues surrounding school
searches and how students' rights have decreased over time
under the reasonableness standard and qualified immunity.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,9 schools' used various approaches to school
searches.' 0 After T.L.O., courts began to limit students'
Fourth An'endment rights. Today, schools search for
drugs, weapons, and evidence of drug use, and according to
the courts, these searches do not violate students' rights."l
Even if the courts consider some searches unreasonable,
qualified immunity protects teachers from liability because
the law surrounding these searches often is not clearly
established. Thus, school officials can act with impunity
because courts will likely perceive the search as reasonable
or grant school officials qualified immunity for their actions. If this pattern continues, students will retain no constitutional rights within school walls, and this deprivation
of Fourth Amendment rights could extend beyond school
walls into everyday citizens' lives.
II.
Back in the Day... The History of School
Searches and Students' Fourth Amendment Rights
Before 1985, courts in every jurisdiction approached students' Fourth Amendment rights differently. 12
The approaches offered four different levels of protection:
7 Beard, 402
8

F.3d at 604 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65).

Id. at 601.

9 469 U.S. at 325-26 (holding that the Fourth Amendment, excluding

the warrant requirement, applied to schools).
1o See id. at 340.
11See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346-48.
v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (mem.)

12 Bellnier

(internal citation omitted).
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the Fourth Amendment did not apply; the Fourth Amendment applied, but the Exclusionary Rule did not; the Fourth
Amendment did apply, but in loco parentis used the reasonableness standard to evaluate the search; or the Fourth
Amendment fully applied. 13 Although the courts varied on
students' Fourth Amendment rights, the Seventh Circuit
declared that nude searches of children "exceeded the14
'bounds of reason' by two and a half country miles."
Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit adopted a balancing test,
which weighed "the [F]ourth [A]mendment rights of individual students with the interests of the state and the school
officials in the maintenance of a proper
educational envi15
youth."
today's
educate
to
ronment
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided a watershed
case, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 16 which created the "special
needs" doctrine for school searches. 17 The special needs
doctrine allowed for warrantless searches when "a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard."' 8 If the search fulfilled the two-part test, then it
met the reasonableness standard. 19 The search had to be
"justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." 20 The Supreme Court did not decide if "individualized suspicion [was] an essential element of the reasonableness standard" because the Fourth Amendment did

13Id. (internal citations omitted).

Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984).
16 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
14

15 Tarter

17

Id.at 351 (Blackman, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).

18
Id.at 341 (majority opinion).
19 1d.
20 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).

3
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not list it as a requirement. 2 1 The Supreme Court believed
that school officials could easily apply a reasonableness
standard.22 The dissent, however, warned that this standard
uncertainty among teachers and adwould cause "greater
23
ministrators.

The courts applied the two-part test to determine the
constitutionality of searches, but some courts clarified the
Supreme Court's test. In one case, the court held that a
student's conduct must create "a reasonable suspicion that a
specific rule or law has been violated and that a search
could reasonably be expected to produce evidence of that
violation. 24 Without reasonable suspicion of a violation,
the court cannot deem a search reasonable. 25
The courts also considered the search's reasonableness under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. 26 If a
search occurred because of a student's tip, the courts look
at the totality of the circumstances to determine if school
officials need to investigate further before conducting a
search.27 The totality of the circumstances applied to strip
searches because factors, like "age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction," determined if a search's
scope was reasonable. 28 Small sums of money did not
warrant a strip search, and courts considered these searches

Id. at 342 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 343.
23 Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
24 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(mem.); see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (footnote omitted).
25 See Cales, 635 F. Supp. at 457.
21

22

26

Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 888 (6th Cir.

1991) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding that
an informant's tip needs to be evaluated under a totality of the circums-

tances inquiry)).

27 See id. at 888-89.
28 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at

342 (footnote omitted).
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as unreasonable. 29 Without individualized suspicion, strip
searches lacked justification unless a "legitimate safety
concern" existed, and officials "must be investigating allegations of violations of the law or school rules . . . 30
Additionally,
these searches needed to be "minimally intru31
sive."
Courts attempted to limit the use of suspicion-less
searches if the students were not athletes. 32 Because athletes chose to participate in school athletics, they should
"expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." 33 Physical education students, however,
"[do not] willingly subject themselves to this degree of
intrusion." 34 Additionally, a suspicion-less search will not
be considered reasonable in lieu of a possible "suspicionbased search" because the government's needs "will never
be strong enough to outweigh" an individual's privacy
interests. 35 If school officials request the police officers'
presence, or the police officers work at the school, then the
reasonable suspicion standard applies. 36 Otherwise, they
37
must show probable cause.
See Oliver ex rel. Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) (mern) (referring to the argument in Doe v. Renfrow that a
29

strip search for $4.50 is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
30 Konop ex rel. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1201
(D.S.D. 1998) (meni). But see Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515

U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (holding that student athletes were subject to
suspicion-less drug testing because they had a "decreased expectation
of privacy," the search was relatively unobtrusive, and the severity of
drug use in schools was a serious concern).
Konop, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
32 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; Bell v.
Marseille Elementary Sch.,
160 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887-88 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (mem.).
33 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (internal citations omitted).
34
Bell, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
35
Id. at n.5 (quoting Willis v. Alderson Cnty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d
415,421 (7th Cir. 1998)).
36 Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379
F.3d 358, 372 (6th Cir. 2004)
(Moore,
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
3
7 d. at 372-73.
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III.
Qualified Immunity: School Officials' "In Case
of Unreasonable Search-Break Glass" Defense
A school official may claim qualified immunity if
courts deem the search unreasonable. Qualified immunity
"is an affirmative defense," and as state officials, school
officials can invoke it. 38 Before the Supreme Court's deci39 this immunity had objective
sion in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

and subjective elements. 40 The Supreme Court, however,
eliminated the subjective element because the "judicial
inquiry" could disrupt "effective government.' 1 Because
qualified immunity is a question of law, courts must determine if qualified immunity protects the official.42
Qualified immunity requires an examination of "the
objective reasonableness of an official's conduct." 43 If the
courts think, "the law was clearly established," then the
official loses the immunity because a "public official
should know the law governing his conduct." 44 To deter-

mine whether a right is clearly established, courts examine
Supreme Court decisions; its own decisions, as well as
45
other decisions in its circuit; and other circuits' decisions.
Most cases turn on whether a right is clearly established, but "a constitutional or statutory violation" must
occur. 46

Thus, courts must look at the situation and deter-

mine whether "the [official's] conduct violated a constituHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)).
38

39
40

d. at

800.

Id. at 815.
41 Id. at 817 (footnotes omitted).

See McBride v. Village of Michiana, 100 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir.
1996) (internal citations omitted).
43 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (footnote omitted).
42

44 Id. at 818-19 (footnote omitted).
45 See McBride, 100 F.3d at 460.
46 Saylor v. Bd. of Educ. of Harlan County, 118 F.3d 507, 512 (6th
Cir.

1997) (internal citations omitted).
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tional right[.]" 47 If the official violated a right, then the
court considers whether that right was clearly established. 48
A right is clearly established if "a reasonable official would
49
understand that what he is doing violates that right.",
Even if courts have not previously addressed the exact
conduct, an official may lose qualified immunity if "in the
50
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent.,
Thus, "officials can still be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. 51
Finally, courts must examine the official's actions
for objective unreasonableness, which can be determined
"from direct holdings, from specific examples described as
prohibited, or from the general reasoning that a court employs., 52 This evaluation "requires a careful balancing of.
. the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake." 53 Once
these criteria are met, the official loses qualified immunity
and may be liable for the unconstitutional conduct.
IV.

The Beard Strip Search

Beard began with a strip search for stolen money
during a gym class. 54 The acting principal called the police
47

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (internal citations omit-

ted).

48 See id.
49 Id.at

202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)).
0Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir.
2004) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
51Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
52Champion, 380

F.3d at 902 (quoting Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d
843,

848 (6th Cir. 2003)).
53Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep't, 389 F.3d 167, 173-74 (6th
Cir.
54 2004) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
Beard v.Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.

2005).
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and asked three teachers for assistance. 55 The teachers
56
separated the students and searched their backpacks.
During the search, a male teacher made the boys remove
57
their shirts, lower their pants, and lower their underwear.
To avoid gender discrimination, the girls endured a strip
search, which required them to lift their shirts and lower
their pants. 58 The teachers did not 59touch the students, and
the search yielded no stolen money.
The students sued the school, and the school filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity.60 The district court denied the motion on the basis that
the law involving strip searches for missing money was
clearly established. 6 1 The defendants appealed to the Sixth
Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision. 62 The
Sixth Circuit held that "the law did not clearly establish that
the searches
were unconstitutional under these circums63
tances."
In this case, the court addressed the issue of whether
the law clearly establishes that suspicion-less strip searches
of students are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. This case demonstrates that school officials have
protection from liability even in an unconstitutional school
search. Therefore, students lack constitutional protections
from a search under the reasonableness standard. The Supreme Court's claim that students "do not shed their consti-

55

id.

56 Id.
57 id.

58 Id.

at 602.

59
Id.
60

at 601-02.

Id. at 601.
61Id. at 602.
62 id.
63 id.
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tutional rights at the school house gate" is practically obsolete in today's schools.64
The Sixth Circuit had to decide if school officials
merited qualified immunity. 65 First, the court examined
whether the searches violated the students' Fourth
Amendment rights under the reasonableness standard.6 6
The Sixth Circuit evaluated whether the search was "justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances." 67 The search was "justified at inception,"
but the search's scope was unconstitutional.6 8 The search
occurred in a compulsory gym class, and the students, unlike athletes, did not choose "to be regulated more closely
than the general student population." 69 As such, they merited a greater expectation of privacy than student athletes
did. 70 The search was highly intrusive because the students
disrobed, and the girls' searches, unlike the boys' searches,
occurred with other students present.7 1 Finally, the search
attempted to locate missing money, which courts have
considered to serve "a less weighty governmental interest
than a search undertaken for items that pose a threat to the

64 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)

(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
65 Beard,
402 F.3d at 603.
66 Id.; accord Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901
6th Cir. 2004).
7New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (internal citation
omitted).
68
Beard 402 F.3d at 604-06.

Id. at 605.
See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662, 664-65
(1995) (holding that suspicion-less drug searches are constitutional
when performed on student athletes).
71 CompareBeard, 402 F.3d at 606 with Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379 F.3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 2004) (demonstrating that a strip
search's intrusive nature can be minimized by conducting them in
private rooms with a minimal number of staff).
69
70
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health or safety of students, such as drugs or weapons. 72
These factors, along with no individualized suspicion or
scope to be unconstitutional
consent, caused the search's 73
Amendment.
Fourth
the
under
Because a constitutional violation occurred, the
Sixth Circuit had to determine if the law was clearly established "in light of the specific context of the case, not as a
broad general proposition." 74 In search of guidance, the
Sixth Circuit examined Supreme Court cases, cases in the
Sixth Circuit, and cases in other circuits. 75 The Sixth Circuit noted that Vernonia76 and T.L.O. 77 articulated basic
search principles. 78 These cases, however, offered school
officials no guidance about what would constitute notice
"that the searches ...

were unreasonable" because the Su-

preme Court's test for reasonableness did not "explain how
the factors should be applied" when school officials encountered these situations. 79 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit
noted, "the reasonableness standard... has left courts later
confronted with the issue either reluctant or unable to define what type of80official conduct would be subject to a...
'
cause of action."
The Sixth Circuit cases do not clarify whether the
law surrounding strip searches was clearly established. The
court granted qualified immunity in two cases because of
individualized suspicion of certain students, but in another
72 Beard, 402 F.3d at 605; accord Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661; Oliver ex

rel. Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. id. 1995)

tmem.).
3

74

Beard, 402 F.3d at 606.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

Beard, 402 F.3d at 606-07; see McBride v. Village of Michiana, 100
F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1996).
7'

515 U.S. 646 (1995).
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Beard, 402 F.3d at 607 (internal citations omitted).
79
76

77
78

id.

80 1d. (quoting

Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881,
886 (6th Cir. 1991)).

10

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

125

case, the court denied qualified immunity because a rule or
law violation may not have occurred. 81 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit cases yielded
no clear stance on strip searches for
82
officials.
school
Other circuits have established a clear stance on
strip searches, but the Sixth Circuit believes that these cases
do not clearly establish "the unlawfulness of the defendants' actions in this case." 83 The Sixth Circuit only uses
opinions from other circuits if they "point unmistakably to
the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and
[are] so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority
as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that
his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would
be found wanting." 84 Because these cases do not meet this
standard, the Sixth Circuit held that the law was not clearly
established
and granted the school officials qualified im85
munity.
V.

Ramifications of Beard on Future School
Searches and Students' Rights

Beard shows how the reasonableness standard and
qualified immunity has eroded students' rights and granted
school officials enormous leeway in their searches. Initially, students' Fourth Amendment rights varied from school
to school, but after T.L.O., a reasonableness standard governed school searches. 86 The courts have broadened this
standard. Under the reasonableness standard, school officials do not necessarily need individualized suspicion, but
81See Williams, 936 F.2d at 889; Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 984

(6th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted). But see Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch.,
635 F. Supp. 454,458 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (mem.).
82
Beard, 402 F.3d at 608.

83 Id.
84 Id. (quoting Williams, 936 F.2d at 885) (alteration in original).
85

Id.

86 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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individualized suspicion could ensure that school officials
will be entitled qualified immunity. 87 Thanks to the confusion, teachers do not know which searches are constitutional and perform questionable searches as a result. Justice
Brennan's prediction in T.L.O. that the reasonableness
88
standard would cause confusion has come true.
Beard proves that courts need to define the law surrounding school searches more clearly. Otherwise, teachers can act with impunity because either they do not know
the law, or they know that the confusion in the law will
protect them. Because the law in various circuits is in a
state of disarray, students lack protection within school
walls. The added exceptions and qualifications to the reasonableness standard do not aid teachers in understanding
the law; they only create more confusion. Without a clearly established standard for school searches, teachers almost
always merit qualified immunity, and no check or balance
exists to prevent them from trampling on students' rights.
Thus, students' Fourth Amendment rights practically do not
exist because the courts consider the searches reasonable or
qualified immunity exists. Beard is a distress signal to the
courts to reach a consensus on what is and is not constitutional in school searches.
Beard has far-reaching future implications. First,
Beard demonstrates that teachers can conduct unreasonable
and unconstitutional searches with little fear of liability.
The decision allows teachers to see how far they can tread
on students' rights because liability will not result thanks to
qualified immunity. Second, if schools continue to conduct
strip searches, the courts may eventually consider them
reasonable in all situations. For example, the courts may
87

See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1995);

see also Williams, 936 F.2d at 889 (stating that the principal's reasonable suspicion that students were concealing drugs provided him with
qualified immunity for his search).
8 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 365. (Brennan, J. concurring in part, dissenting

in part).
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find a school's actions reasonable enough to allow strip
searches in group situations without individualized suspicion. Third, Beard demonstrates that a clearly defined
standard on student searches must exist to prevent students
from "shed[ding] their rights at the school house gate." 89 If
students have no rights in school searches, then the trend
will spread from schools into society at large.
Fourth, this decision demonstrates that schools have
become more concerned with crime prevention and safety
than educating students. Teachers conduct unconstitutional
searches under the guise of protecting students. The courts
deem these searches unconstitutional, but the teachers still
receive qualified immunity for their actions because the
courts believe that today's schools are unsafe. If teachers
must evaluate reasonableness, conduct a search, and prove
that the law was not clearly established, when do they educate students? Teachers spend more time policing students
and defending their actions than educating students. Without education, our government, judicial system, and society
in general will suffer from ignorance.
VI.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Beard demonstrates how students'
Fourth Amendment rights and school searches have come
full circle. Even with the reasonableness standard, a state
of confusion still exists, and qualified immunity protects
teachers from liability. Students receive no benefits from
the reasonableness standard. The courts must reach a consensus on the law in this area, or students will continue to
endure unreasonable searches. If the law continues in its
state of disarray, then students may have no Fourth
Amendment rights in schools because the courts continue
Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Crnmy. Sch. Dist., 393
89

U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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to add exceptions. The courts must set a clear standard on
school searches so that teachers and students can return to
the important tasks of teaching and learning.
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